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Abstract
We present a survey of the work on control-ﬂow analysis carried on by the Venice Team during
the Meﬁsto project. We study security issues, in particular information leakage detection, in the
context of the Mobile Ambient calculus. We describe BANANA, a Java-based tool for ambient
nesting analysis, by focussing on analysis accuracy and algorithmic optimizations.
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1 Introduction
In recent years networks have become an essential aspect of our daily comput-
ing environment. In such a framework, mobility may be supported in diﬀerent
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forms: physical, e.g., laptops, personal organizers moving around, smart cards
entering a network computer slot, and logical, e.g., code or agent mobility.
The main scientiﬁc and technological challenge in this setting is to provide
security to applications which operate in untrusted and possibly unknown en-
vironments. Indeed, distributed applications rely on network communications
thus, apart from being potential victims of computer viruses, they can be tam-
pered and eavesdropped in many ways, and for this reason they are vulnerable
and insecure. In general, mobile code and communication may need to cross
administrative domains and ﬁrewalls, and untrusted sites as well. Techniques
such as cryptography may solve some problems related to data communica-
tion, but, when executable code is exchanged, such techniques may not be
suﬃcient anymore. Much research eﬀort has been devoted to protect servers
from untrusted and potentially malicious mobile code. On the converse, mo-
bile code must be protected from potentially malicious servers that may try
to disclose or modify its sensible private data.
These security issues constitute a very interesting workbench to evaluate
the theoretical and practical impact of static analysis techniques. Giving a
way for statically verifying a security property has, in principle, the advantage
of making the checking of the properties more eﬃcient; moreover it allows us
to write programs which are secure-by-construction, e.g., when the performed
analysis is proved to imply some behavioural security properties. A substan-
tial body of research is available, relying on diﬀerent static techniques and
modeling languages, verifying diﬀerent security properties [3,14,16,25].
In this paper we present a survey of the work on control-ﬂow analysis
carried on by the Venice Team during the Meﬁsto project. The goal was
twofold: on one side, to tackle information ﬂow security of mobile code with
control ﬂow analysis techniques, on the other side, to optimize time and space
complexities of our and existing approaches.
Our approach is based on the calculus of Mobile Ambients (MA), pro-
posed by Cardelli and Gordon [11], where the notion of ambient captures the
structure and properties of wide area networks, of mobile computing, and of
mobile computation. An ambient is an abstraction of the notion of both agent
and location. Like an agent, an ambient may move around by exploiting its
capabilities. Furthermore, ambients can be arbitrarily nested, forming a tree
structure that models the hierarchical organization of administrative domains.
In order to study this problem in an abstract manner, we consider the “pure”
Mobile Ambients calculus, with no communication channel and where the only
possible actions are represented by the moves performed by mobile processes.
In this way, we may study a very general notion of information ﬂow which,
in our opinion, should be applicable also to more “concrete” versions of the
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calculus [9,17].
Our focus is on Multilevel Security, a particular Mandatory Access Con-
trol security policy: every entity is bound to a security level (for simplicity,
we consider only two levels: high and low), and information may only ﬂow
from the low level to the high one. Typically, two access rules are imposed:
(i) No Read Up, a low level entity cannot access information of a high level
entity; (ii)No Write Down, a high level entity cannot leak information to a
low level entity. In order to detect information leakages, a typical approach
(see, e.g., [1,2]) consists of directly deﬁning how information may ﬂow from
one level to another one. Then, it is suﬃcient to verify if, in any system exe-
cution, no ﬂow of information is possible from level high to level low. We have
followed the above approach.
The starting point of our research was the Control Flow Analysis by Niel-
son et al. presented in [15]. In [7], we reﬁned such an analysis in order
to detect information leakage. Both analyses have been implemented in the
Banana(Boundary Ambient Nesting ANAlysis) tool [4], a Java applet avail-
able at http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼mefisto/BANANA/. This survey will describe both
the technical details of the analyses implemented in the tool, and the imple-
mentation issues behind Banana.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the basic terminology of Mobile Ambient calculus and we brieﬂy report the
control ﬂow analyses of [15,20] and of [6,7]. Then, in Section 3, we present
the algorithms implemented in the Banana tool, which is described in detail
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Information Flow in Mobile Ambients
In this section we ﬁrst introduce the basic terminology of Mobile Ambient
calculus, then we brieﬂy report the Control Flow Analysis of [15,20] and its
reﬁnement proposed in [6,7].
2.1 Mobile Ambients
The Mobile Ambient calculus has been introduced in [10,11] with the main
purpose of explicitly modeling mobility. Indeed, ambients are arbitrarily
nested boundaries which can move around through suitable capabilities. The
syntax of processes is given as follows, where n ∈ Amb denotes an ambient
name.
Intuitively, the restriction (νn)P introduces the new name n and limits its
scope to P ; process 0 does nothing; P | Q is P and Q running in parallel;
replication provides recursion and iteration as !P represents any number of
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P,Q ::= (νn)P restriction
| 0 inactivity
| P | Q composition
| !P replication
| n
a
[ P ] ambient
| in
t
n . P capability to enter n
| out
t
n . P capability to exit n
| open
t
n . P capability to open n
Fig. 1. Mobile Ambients Syntax
copies of P in parallel. By n
a
[ P ] we denote the ambient named n with
the process P running inside it. The capabilities in
t
n and out
t
n move their
enclosing ambients in and out ambient n, respectively; the capability open
t
n
is used to dissolve the boundary of a sibling ambient n. The operational
semantics of a process P is given through a suitable reduction relation →
between processes. Intuitively, P → Q represents the possibility for P of
reducing to Q through some computation. (See [10] for more details.) We
will use the standard notation P →∗ Q to denote a reduction of process P to
process Q performed in 0 or more steps.
Labels a ∈ Laba on ambients and labels t ∈ Labt on capabilities (transi-
tions) are introduced as it is customary in static analysis to indicate “program
points”. We denote with Lab the set of all the labels Laba ∪ Labt. We use
the special label env ∈ Laba to denote the external environment, i.e., the
environment containing the process under observation.
Given a process P , we also introduce the notation Laba(P ) to denote the
set of ambient labels in P plus the special label env, Labt(P ) to denote the set
of capability labels in P , and Lab(P ) to denote Laba(P )∪Labt(P ). Moreover,
Na = |Lab
a(P )|, Nt = |Lab
t(P )|, and NLab = |Lab(P )| = Na+Nt. With N we
denote the global number of operators occurring in P . Note that NLab < N ,
as there is at least one occurrence of 0 in every non-empty process.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that the ambient and capability labels
occurring in a process P are all distinct. Performing the Control Flow Anal-
ysis with all distinct labels produces a more precise result that can be later
approximated by equating some labels.
Example 2.1 Let P1 be a process modeling an envelope sent from venice to
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pisa:
venice[ envelope[ out venice . in pisa . 0 ] | Q ] |
pisa[ open envelope . 0 ]
Initially, envelope is in site venice. Then, it exits venice and enters site pisa
by applying its capabilities out venice and in pisa, respectively. Once site
pisa receives envelope, it reads its content by consuming its open envelope
capability. Finally, process P1 reaches the state: venice[Q ] | pisa[ 0 ] . 
In order to deal with security issues, information is classiﬁed into diﬀerent
levels of conﬁdentiality. This is obtained by exploiting the labelling of ambi-
ents. In particular, the set of ambient labels is partitioned into three disjoint
sets: high, low and boundary labels (LabaH , Lab
a
L and Lab
a
B, respectively).
Ambients labelled with boundary labels (boundary ambients) are the ones re-
sponsible for conﬁning conﬁdential information. Information leakage occurs if
a high level ambient exits a boundary, thus becoming possibly exposed to a
malicious ambient attack.
Example 2.2 Let P2 be a labelled extension of process P1, in which the
envelope contains conﬁdential data hdata (labelled high) which need to be
safely sent from venice to pisa.
veniceb1 [ envelopeb2[ outc1 venice . inc2 pisa . 0 | hdatah[ 0 ] ] ] |
pisab3[ openc3 envelope . 0 ]
In this case, venice, pisa and envelope must be labelled boundary to pro-
tect hdata during the whole execution. 
The ﬂow of high level data/ambients outside security boundaries, which
we want to detect and avoid, may be formalised as follows.
Definition 2.3 [Information Leakage] Given a process P and a labelling Laba(P),
P does not leak a secret h ∈ LabaH(P ) if and only if ∀Q such that P →
∗ Q,
all occurrences of h are contained inside, i.e., “protected by”, at least one
boundary ambient.
2.2 Control Flow Analysis
The Control Flow Analysis (CFA for short) of a process P described in [15]
aims at modeling the possible ambient nestings occurring in the execution of
P . It works on pairs (Iˆ, Hˆ), where:
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• The ﬁrst component Iˆ is an element of ℘(Laba(P )×Lab(P )). If process P ,
during its execution, contains an ambient labelled a having inside either a
capability or an ambient labelled , then (a, ) is expected to belong to Iˆ.
• The second component Hˆ ∈ ℘(Laba(P ) × Amb) keeps track of the cor-
respondence between names and labels. If process P contains an ambient
labelled a with name n, then (a, n) is expected to belong to Hˆ . 6
• The pairs are component-wise partially ordered by set inclusion.
The analysis is deﬁned as usual by a representation and a speciﬁcation func-
tions [21]. They are recalled in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively, where unionsq
denotes the component-wise union of the elements of the pairs.
(res) βCF ((νn)P ) = β
CF
 (P )
(zero) βCF (0) = (∅, ∅)
(par) βCF (P | Q) = β
CF
 (P ) unionsq β
CF
 (Q)
(repl) βCF (!P ) = β
CF
 (P )
(amb) βCF (n
a[ P ] ) = βCFa (P ) unionsq ({(, 
a)} , {(a, n)})
(in) βCF (in
t n . P ) = βCF (P ) unionsq ({(, 
t)} , ∅)
(out) βCF (out
t n . P ) = βCF (P ) unionsq ({(, 
t)} , ∅)
(open) βCF (open
t n . P ) = βCF (P ) unionsq ({(, 
t)} , ∅)
Fig. 2. Representation Function for the Control Flow Analysis
The representation function aims at mapping concrete values to their best
abstract representation. It is given in terms of a function βCF (P ) which maps
process P into a pair (Iˆ,Hˆ) corresponding to the initial state of P , with respect
to an enclosing ambient labelled with . The representation of a process P is
deﬁned as βCFenv(P ).
Example 2.4 Let P3 be the process n
a
1 [ m
a
2 [ out
t
n.0 ] ] . The representa-
tion function of P3 is β
CF
env(P3) = ({(env, 
a
1
), (a
1
, a
2
), (a
2
, t)}, {(a
1
, n), (a
2
, m)}).
Notice that all ambient nestings are captured by the ﬁrst component {(env, a
1
),
(a1, 
a
2), (
a
2, 
t)}, while all the correspondences between ambients and labels of
P3 are kept by the second one, i.e., {(
a
1
, n), (a
2
, m)}. 
6 We are assuming that ambient names are stable, i.e., n is a representative for a class of α-
convertible names, following the same approach of [20]. In [15,23], an alternative treatment
of α-equivalence is used, where bound names are annotated with markers, and a marker
environment me is associated to constraints.
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(res) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF (νn)P iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P
(zero) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF 0 always
(par) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF P | Q iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P ∧ (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF Q
(repl) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF !P iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P
(amb) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF n
a
[ P ] iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P
(in) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF in
t
n . P iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P ∧
∀a, a
′
, a
′′
∈ Laba(P ) : ((a, t) ∈ Iˆ ∧ (a
′′
, a) ∈ Iˆ
∧ (a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ Iˆ ∧ (a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ) =⇒ (a
′
, a) ∈ Iˆ
(out) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF out
t
n . P iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P ∧
∀a, a
′
, a
′′
∈ Laba(P ) : ((a, t) ∈ Iˆ ∧ (a
′
, a) ∈ Iˆ
∧ (a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ Iˆ ∧ (a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ) =⇒ (a
′′
, a) ∈ Iˆ
(open) (Iˆ, Hˆ) |=CF open
t
n . P iﬀ (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P ∧
∀a, a
′
∈ Laba(P ), ∀′ ∈ Lab(P ) : ((a, t) ∈ Iˆ ∧ (a, a
′
) ∈ Iˆ
∧ (a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ ∧ (a
′
, ′) ∈ Iˆ) =⇒ (a, ′) ∈ Iˆ
Fig. 3. Speciﬁcation of the Control Flow Analysis
The speciﬁcation states a closure condition of a pair (Iˆ , Hˆ) with respect to
all the possible moves executable on a process P . It mostly relies on recursive
calls on subprocesses except for the three capabilities open, in, and out. For
instance, the rule for open-capability states that if some ambient labelled a
has an open-capability t on an ambient n, that may apply due to the presence
of a sibling ambient labelled a
′
whose name is n, then the result of performing
that capability should also be recorded in Iˆ, i.e., all the ambients/capabilities
nested in a
′
have to be nested also in a.
Example 2.5 Consider again process P3 of Example 2.4. Note that it may
evolve to n
a
1 [ 0 ] | m
a
2 [ 0 ] . It is easy to prove that the least solution for P3 is
(Iˆ,Hˆ), where Iˆ= {(env, a
1
), (env, a
2
), (a
1
, a
2
), (a
2
, t)}, Hˆ = {(a
1
, n), (a
2
, m)}.
Notice that the analysis correctly captures, through the pair (env, a2), the
possibility for m to exit from n. 
The correctness of the analysis is proven by showing that every reduction
of the semantics is properly mimicked in the analysis, with 	 denoting the
component-wise set inclusion.
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Theorem 2.6 [15] Let P be a process. If (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF P and βCFenv(P ) 	 (Iˆ , Hˆ)
and P →∗ P ′, then βCFenv(P
′) 	 (Iˆ , Hˆ).
2.3 Boundary Ambients Nesting Analysis
The analysis presented in the previous section was not security-oriented, thus
it did not exploit the information about “secure” nestings inside boundaries.
In [6,7], we propose a more accurate abstract domain that separately consid-
ers nesting inside and outside security boundaries, yielding to a much more
sophisticated control ﬂow analysis for detecting unwanted boundary crossing,
i.e., information leakage. The main idea is to distinguish among nestings either
protected or unprotected by boundaries. More speciﬁcally, the Iˆ component
of the abstract domain is split into two (not necessarily disjoint) sets, IˆB and
IˆE, recording the protected and unprotected nestings, respectively, with B
standing for Boundary, and E for External environment. Thus the result of
the reﬁned analysis is given by means of a triplet (IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ).
Also in this case, the analysis is deﬁned by a representation function and a
speciﬁcation. The representation function collects in IˆB (IˆE) all the nestings
of ambients initially (not) contained in at least one boundary ambient.
Example 2.7 Consider again process P3 of Example 2.4, i.e., of the form:
P3 = n
a
1 [ m
a
2 [ out
t
n ] ] , with a
1
∈ LabaB(P ) and 
a
2
∈ LabaL(P ), thus the
representation function of P is the following: βBenv(P ) = ({(
a
1, 
a
2), (
a
2, 
t)},
{(env, a
1
)}, {(a
1
, n), (a
2
, m)}). The representation function correctly captures
the fact that boundary ambient n protects all of his sub-ambients and capa-
bilities, i.e., both (a1, 
a
2) and (
a
2, 
t) are recorded in IˆB. 
We do not report the whole analysis speciﬁcation (see [6,7] for more de-
tails). Instead, we explain how it diﬀers from [15] by considering, e.g., the
out-capability (see Figure 4). Within the speciﬁcation of the analysis, the
predicate pathB(
a, ) is used to simplify the notation. Intuitively, it repre-
sents a protected path of nestings from ambient labelled a to ambient labelled
, in which none of the ambients is a boundary. The rule for the out-capability
states that if some ambient labelled a has an out-capability t on an ambient
n, that may apply due to the presence of a direct ancestor ambient labelled
a
′
whose name is n, then the result of performing that capability should also
be recorded in either IˆB or IˆE, depending on the level of protection of the
newly generated nestings. The rule is split into three distinct cases: (i) an
ambient exits a boundary, thus moving to an unprotected environment, (ii)
all ambients are protected, and ﬁnally (iii) all ambients are unprotected. In
the ﬁrst case, all the nestings from the moving ambient a to new protecting
boundaries have to be copied in IˆE , since after the out move they become
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unprotected. The in and open-capabilities behave similarly.
(out) (IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ) |=
B out
t
n . P iﬀ (IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ) |=
B P ∧
∀a, a
′
, a
′′
∈ Laba(P ) :
case ((a, t) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, a) ∈ IˆE ∪ IˆB ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆE
∧ (a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ) =⇒
if ( a ∈ LabaB(P )) then (
a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆE
else (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆE ∧
n
(, ′) ∈ IˆB | pathB(
a, )
o
⊆ IˆE
case ((a, t) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, a) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆB ∧ (
a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ)
=⇒ (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆB
case ((a, t) ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′
, a) ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′′
, a
′
) ∈ IˆE ∧ (
a
′
, n) ∈ Hˆ)
=⇒ (a
′′
, a) ∈ IˆE
Fig. 4. Speciﬁcation of the reﬁned Control Flow Analysis - the out rule
Example 2.8 Let P be the process of Example 2.7. The least solution of P
is the triplet (IˆB,IˆE ,Hˆ) where IˆB= {(
a
1
, a
2
), (a
2
, t)}, IˆE= {(env, 
a
1
), (env, a
2
),
(a2, 
t)}, and Hˆ = {(a1, n), (
a
2, m)}. 
We now obtain an extension of Theorem 2.6:
Theorem 2.9 Let P be a process. If (IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ) |=
B P and βBenv(P ) 	
(IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ) and P →
∗ P ′, then βBenv(P
′) 	 (IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ).
The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in terms of informa-
tion ﬂows. No leakage of secret data/ambients outside the boundary ambients
is possible if in the analysis h (a high level datum) does not appear in any of
the pairs belonging to IˆE .
Corollary 2.10 Let P be a process and h ∈ LabaH(P ) a high level label. Let
βBenv(P ) 	 (IˆB, IˆE, Hˆ) and (IˆB, IˆE , Hˆ) |=
B P and ∀(
′
, 
′′
) ∈ IˆE, 
′′

= h. Then,
P does not leak secret h.
Example 2.11 Consider, for instance, a further reﬁnement of process P2 of
Example 2.2. In this case, the high level data is willing to enter some translator
process, which could possibly be low level code coming from the external
environment.
veniceb1 [ envelopeb2[ outc1 venice . inc2 pisa . 0 |
hdatah[ inc3 translator . 0 ] ] ] |
pisab3[ openc4 envelope . 0 ] |
translatorm[ inc5 envelope . 0 ] | openc6 translator . 0
In this case, the translator behaves correctly with respect to information leak-
age, i.e., it only enters boundaries. In particular, this means it will never carry
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high level data outside the security boundaries. However, if we compute the
CFA of [15], we obtain the following least solution:
Iˆ = {(env, b1), (env, b2), (env, h), (env, b3), (env,m), (env, c5), (env, c6),
(b1, b2), (b2, h), (b2, m), (b2, c1), (b2, c2), (h, c3), (b3, b2), (b3, h), (b3, b3),
(b3,m), (b3, c1), (b3, c2), (b3, c4), (m,h), (m,c5)}
Hˆ = {(b1, venice), (b2, envelope), (b3, pisa), (h, hdata), (m, translator)}
Notice that the pair (env, h) appears in Iˆ, even though there is no execution
leading to such a situation. On the other hand, the reﬁned analysis properly
captures the fact that the translator is entered by conﬁdential data hdata only
once inside boundary pisa, and it never gets out of it, i.e., h appears only
inside protected nestings IˆB.
IˆB = {(b1, b2), (b2, h), (b2, m), (b2, c1), (b2, c2), (h, c3), (b3, b2), (b3, h), (b3, b3),
(b3,m), (b3, c1), (b3, c2), (b3, c4), (m,h), (m,c5)}
IˆE = {(env, b1), (env, b2), (env, b3), (env,m), (env, c5), (env, c6), (m, c5)}
Hˆ = {(b1, venice), (b2, envelope), (b3, pisa), (h, hdata), (m, translator)}
Thus, the boundary analysis is strictly more precise than the one of [15]. 
3 Algorithms for Nesting Analyses
In this section we describe the diﬀerent implementations of the analyses de-
scribed so far, which are the core of the Banana tool.
3.1 Eﬃcient algorithms for the Control Flow Analysis
The computation of ambient nesting analysis, like [7,15,20], requires consid-
erably high complexities, thus the design of eﬃcient techniques is very impor-
tant.
This is the ﬁrst motivation behind the work presented in [23] by Nielson
and Seidl. Assuming N is the size of a process, the authors introduce two
diﬀerent algorithms that in O(N4) and O(N3) steps, respectively compute
the ambient nesting analysis. The algorithms ﬁrst perform a translation of
the Control Flow Analysis constraints into ground Horn clauses. Then, these
clauses are processed through satisﬁability standard algorithms [12] in order to
compute the least solution. As such algorithms always consider all the ground
clauses corresponding to the analysis constraints, even in the best case, all the
clauses need to be generated.
In [5], we introduce two new algorithms which improve both time and
space complexities of the techniques proposed by Nielson and Seidl. Space
C. Braghin et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 99 (2004) 319–337328
complexity of those algorithms is O(N4 logN) and O(N3 logN) bits, respec-
tively, while the one of both our algorithms is O(N2 logN) bits. Regarding
time, the worst case complexity is of the same order, i.e., O(N4) and O(N3)
steps, respectively. In the Nielson and Seidl techniques, those complexities
are tight because of the need of generating all the ground Horn clauses, as ex-
plained above. Instead, our schemes perform better for some particular small
solutions (e.g., solutions that are linear to the size of the process), reaching a
complexity of O(N3) and O(N2) steps, respectively.
These improvements are ﬁrst achieved by enhancing the data structure
representations. Then, we attack the problem with a direct operational ap-
proach, i.e., without passing through Horn formulas. Finally, we reduce the
computation to the Control Flow Analysis constraints that are eﬀectively nec-
essary to get to the least solution. In fact, the algorithms dynamically choose,
in an on the ﬂy manner, only the constraints that are eﬀectively necessary for
the computation of the analysis. This implies that no useless repetition occurs
and there is no need of representing in memory all the possible instantiation
of constraints as done in the Nielson and Seidel approach.
Let us now shortly describe our O(N4) algorithm, called Algorithm 1,
and depicted in Figure 5. The algorithm starts with an empty analysis Iˆ
and with a set of buﬀers containing all the pairs corresponding to the initial
process representation. Recall that, for the correctness of the analysis, these
pairs should be contained in the ﬁnal Iˆ. At each round, one pair is extracted
from the buﬀer and it is added to the solution Iˆ. Only the constraints that are
potentially “activated” by the extracted pair are then considered, i.e., only the
constraints that have such an element in the premise. All the pairs required
by such constraints are then inserted into the buﬀer, so that they will be
eventually added to the solution. This is repeated until a ﬁx-point is reached,
i.e., until all the elements required by the constraints are in the solution. The
most important ingredient in this on-the-ﬂy generation is the use of a buﬀer
together with a matrix which allows to use each pair of labels in the buﬀer
exactly once to generate new pairs.
Let us now analyse Algorithm 1 in more details. We assume that the
parsing of the process has already been done, producing an array cap of
length Nt containing all the capabilities of the input process. For instance,
cap[i] may contain ‘in
t
n”, representing an in capability labelled with t and
with n as target. 7 During the parsing, the representation βCFenv(P ) is computed
giving two initial sets Iˆ0 and Hˆ0 that are stored into an Na ×NLab bit matrix
7 n here represents an integer 1 ≤ n ≤ Na corresponding to the n-th ambient name. The
correspondence between names and integers is kept in the symbol-table produced at the
parsing-time.
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while buf
Iˆ
!= NIL do
(l,l’) := pop
Iˆ
(); M
Iˆ
[l,l’] := true;
for i := 1 to Nt do
case cap[i] of:
in
t
n: if (l’ ∈ Labt(P) and l’ = t)
then for j := 1 to Na do
for k := 1 to Na do
if (M
Iˆ
[k,l] and M
Iˆ
[k,j] and M
Hˆ
[j,n]) then push c
Iˆ
(j,l)
else if (l’ ∈ Laba(P) and M
Iˆ
[l’,t]) then for j:= 1 to Na do
if (M
Iˆ
[l,j] and M
Hˆ
[j,n]) then push c
Iˆ
(j,l’);
if (l’ ∈ Laba(P) and M
Hˆ
[l’,n]) then for j:= 1 to Na do
if (M
Iˆ
[j,t] and M
Iˆ
[l,j]) then push c
Iˆ
(l’,j);
out
t
n: if (l’ ∈ Labt(P) and l’ = t)
then for j := 1 to Na do
for k := 1 to Na do
if (M
Iˆ
[j,l] and M
Iˆ
[k,j] and M
Hˆ
[j,n]) then push c
Iˆ
(k,l)
else if (l’ ∈ Laba(P) and M
Iˆ
[l’,t] and M
Hˆ
[l,n]) then for j:= 1 to Na do
if M
Iˆ
[j,l] then push c
Iˆ
(j,l’);
if (l’ ∈ Laba(P) and M
Hˆ
[l’,n]) then for j:= 1 to Na do
if (M
Iˆ
[j,t] and M
Iˆ
[l’,j]) then push c
Iˆ
(l,j);
open
t
n: if (l’ ∈ Labt(P) and l’ = t)
then for j := 1 to Na do
for k := 1 to NLab do
if (M
Iˆ
[l,j] and M
Iˆ
[j,k] and M
Hˆ
[j,n]) then push c
Iˆ
(l,k)
else if (l’ ∈ Laba(P) and M
Iˆ
[l,t] and M
Hˆ
[l’,n]) then for j:= 1 to NLab do
if M
Iˆ
[l’,j] then push c
Iˆ
(l,j);
if (l’ ∈ Laba(P) and M
Hˆ
[l,n]) then for j:= 1 to Na do
if (M
Iˆ
[j,t] and M
Iˆ
[j,l]) then push c
Iˆ
(j,l’);
Fig. 5. Algorithm 1
BIˆ , and into an Na ×Na bit matrix MHˆ , respectively. By parsing P twice, we
can build BIˆ in such a way that columns from 1 to Na are indexed by ambient
labels, while all the other columns by capability ones. All the pairs in Iˆ0 are
also stored in a stack bufIˆ , on which the usual operations pushIˆ (l,l’) and
popIˆ () apply. Matrix BIˆ is used to eﬃciently check whether an element has
ever been inserted into bufIˆ , thus ensuring that a pair is inserted in bufIˆ
at most once. In particular, the new command push cIˆ (l,l’) applies if BIˆ
[l,l’]=false, and it both executes pushIˆ (l,l’) and sets BIˆ [l,l’] to true. Finally,
we initialize to false another bit matrix MIˆ of size Na×NLab that will contain
the ﬁnal result of the analysis. Also in MIˆ the columns from 1 to Na are
indexed by ambient labels and the ones from Na + 1 to NLab by capability
labels. This initialization phase requires only O(N) steps, since two parsings
of P are suﬃcient.
Example 3.1 Let P be the Firewall Access process of [10,11], where an agent
crosses a ﬁrewall by means of previously arranged passwords k, k′ and k′′
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(see [22] for a detailed analysis of the security issues related to this example):
P = (νw)wa1[ ka2[ outt1 w.int2 k′ .int3 w.0 ] | opent4 k′ . opent5 k′′ . 0 ] |
k′a3[ opent6 k . k′′a4[ 0 ] ]
The least solution of P , as computed using the speciﬁcation of the Control
Flow Analysis depicted in Figure 3, is the pair (Iˆ , Hˆ), where:
Iˆ= {(env, a1), (env, a2), (env, a3), (a1, a1), (a1, a2), (a1, a3), (a1, a4),
(a1, t1), (a1, t2), (a1, t3), (a1, t4), (a1, t5), (a1, t6), (a2, t1), (a2, t2), (a2, t3),
(a3, a1), (a3, a2), (a3, a3), (a3, a4), (a3, t1), (a3, t2), (a3, t3), (a3, t6)},
Hˆ= {(a1, w), (a2, k), (a3, k′), (a4, k′′)}.
Let us see how Algorithm 1 applies to process P . In this case, Na = 5 and Nt =
6, thus BIˆ and MIˆ are 5× 11 bit matrices, MHˆ is a 5× 5 bit matrix, and cap an
array of length 6, initialized as 〈outt1 w, int2 k′, int3 w, opent4 k′, opent5 k′′ ,
opent6 k〉. After the initial parsing, the only pairs in MHˆ which are set to
true are {(a1, w), (a2, k), (a3, k′), (a4, k′′)}, while bufIˆ and BIˆ contain the
pairs 〈(env, a1), (env, a3), (a1, a2), (a3, a4), (a1, t4), (a1, t5), (a2, t1), (a2, t2),
(a2, t3), (a3, t6)〉.
Let the pair (env, a1) be the top element of bufIˆ . The ﬁrst 6 rounds of the
while-loop just move pairs from bufIˆ to MIˆ (no push is performed). Then, at
round 7:
• bufIˆ = 〈(a2, t1), (a2, t2), (a2, t3), (a3, t6)〉
• MIˆ = 〈(env, a1), (env, a3), (a1, a2), (a3, a4), (a1, t4), (a1, t5)〉
• BIˆ = 〈(env, a1), (env, a3), (a1, a2), (a3, a4), (a1, t4), (a1, t5), (a2, t1),
(a2, t2), (a2, t3), (a3, t6)〉.
We extract the top element (a2, t1) of bufIˆ, thus l := a2, and l’ := t1. We show
the ﬁrst iteration, i = 1, where cap[1] is “outt1 w”. Thus, we have l’ = t and
n = w. Since l’ ∈ Labt(P ) and l’ = t, we are in the “then” branch. The
only case that makes true the if condition is when j = a1 and k = env. Since
(a1, w) ∈ MHˆ and both (a1, a2) and (env, a1) are in MIˆ , the pair (env, a2) is
pushed in bufIˆ (note that it is not already in BIˆ ). The algorithm ends after
the 24th round, when bufIˆ is empty. 
More details may be found in [5], where we also present an improved algo-
rithm, called Algorithm 2, based on an optimization of the analysis depicted
in Figure 3. For space reasons, we omit its description.
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3.2 Boundary Ambients Nesting Analysis
In Section 2.3 we described the analysis in terms of a representation and a
speciﬁcation function. It is possible to prove that a least solution for this
analysis always exists and it may be computed as follows: ﬁrst apply the
representation function to the process P , then apply the analysis to validate
the correctness of the proposed solution, adding, if needed, new information
to the triplet until a ﬁx-point is reached. The iterative procedure computes
the least solution independent of the iteration order.
3.3 Boundary Inference for Enforcing Security Policies in Mobile Ambients
The notion of “boundary ambient” and the reﬁned control ﬂow analysis can be
further enhanced to infer which ambients should be “protected” to guarantee
the absence of information leakage for a given process. More speciﬁcally, in [8]
we consider a process P wherein only high level data are known (i.e, LabH is
ﬁxed) and the aim of the analysis is to detect which ambients among the “un-
trusted” ones should be protected and labelled “boundary” to guarantee that
the system is secure. This problem can be properly addressed by re-executing
the Boundary Ambients Nesting Analysis of Section 2.3. A successful analy-
sis infers boundary ambients until a ﬁx-point is reached, returning the set of
ambients that should be “protected”.
The algorithm is described Figure 6. It analyses process P starting from
the initial labeling L0. It may either succeed (in this case a labeling Lk is
reached that fulﬁlls the security property we are interested in) or it may fail.
The latter case simply means that the process P cannot be guaranteed to be
secure by our analysis.
The analysis is currently implemented with a simple ﬁx-point algorithm,
but we are working to extend the optimizations presented in Section 3.1 also
to the Nesting Analysis.
Example 3.2 Consider process P2 of Example 2.2:
venicex[ envelopey[ outc venice . inc pisa ] | hdatah[ inc envelope ] ] |
| pisaz[ openc envelope ]
• Given the set of high level labels LabH in P , the initial label partitioning
L0 is computed. L0 = (LabH = {h},Lab
0
B = {x},Lab
0
L = {y, z})
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Boundary Inference Algorithm
Input: a process P and a partition labeling L0.
(i) Compute the Nesting Analysis with input P and labels Li.
(ii) During the execution of the Fix-Point Algorithm, whenever a high level ambient
n labelled h gets into an unprotected environment, i.e. ∃ : (, h) ∈ IˆE do:
1. if (env, h) ∈ IˆE , the analysis terminates with failure, as it cannot infer a
satisfactory labeling that guarantees absence of information leakage;
2. otherwise, if (env, h) 
∈ IˆE :
– a new labeling Li+1 should be considered, labeling every  such that
(, h) ∈ IˆE as a boundary. Let L = {| (, h) ∈ IˆE} then Li+1 =
(LabH ,Lab
i
B
∪ {L},Labi
L
\ {L}).
– go to (i) with i = i+ 1.
Fig. 6. Boundary inference algorithm
• Applying the representation function βL0 to P , it returns the triplet (IˆoB, Iˆ
o
E, Hˆ):
IˆoB = {(x, y), (x, h), (y, c), (h, c)}
IˆoE = {(env, x), (env, z), (z, c)}
Hˆ = {(h, hdata), (x, venice), (y, envelope), (z, pisa)}
Executing the Fix-Point Algorithm, the pair (y, h) is introduced in IˆE , re-
ﬂecting the fact that ambient envelope leaves ambient venice during the
execution of process P .
• At this point, a new label partitioning should be considered:
L1 = (Lab(P )H = {h},Lab
1
B = {x, y},Lab
1
L = {z})
is computed again. During its execution, the pair (z, h) ∈ IˆE , reﬂecting
the fact that the boundary envelope, containing conﬁdential data, is opened
inside the low ambient pisa during the execution of process P .
• At this point, the following new label partitioning is considered:
L2 = (Lab(P )H = {h},Lab
2
B = {x, y, z},Lab
2
L = ∅)
the Fix-Point Algorithm is computed again, and a ﬁx-point is ﬁnally reached.
Thus, the set of ambients that should be labelled as boundaries is {venice,
envelope, pisa}.

4 Tool Overview
The control ﬂow analysis algorithms described in the previous sections have
been implemented in the Banana(Boundary Ambient Nesting ANAlysis) tool,
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a Java applet available at http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼mefisto/BANANA/.
The main components of Banana can be summarized as follows:
• A textual and graphical editor for Mobile Ambients, to specify and modify
the process by setting ambient nesting capabilities and security attributes
in a very user-friendly fashion.
• A parser which checks for syntax errors and builds the syntax tree out of
the Mobile Ambient process.
• An analyzer which computes an over approximation of all possible nestings
occurring at run-time. The tool supports three diﬀerent control ﬂow anal-
yses, namely the one of Nielson et al. in [15], the one by Braghin et al.
in [6] (called Focardi Cortesi Braghin in the tool), and the one by Braghin et
al. in [8] (FCB Boundary Inference). Five diﬀerent implementations of the
analysis described in [15] are available in the tool. They correspond to:
- a ﬁx-point computation of the least solution of the constraints in Figure
3 (called Nielson in the tool) 8 ;
- a ﬁx-point computation of the least solution of the constraints of the
optimized algorithm of Nielson and Siedl (Nielson Optimized);
- Algorithm 1 of Figure 5 (Buﬀered Boundary Analysis, B.B.A., v1);
- Algorithm 2 of [5] (B.B.A. v2);
- Algorithm 2 of [5] with some code optimizations (B.B.A. v2 Optimized).
• A post-processing module, that interprets the results of the analysis in terms
of the boundary-based information-ﬂow model proposed in [6], where infor-
mation ﬂows correspond to leakages of high-level (i.e., secret) ambients out
of protective (i.e., boundary) ambients, toward the low-level (i.e., untrusted)
environment.
• A detailed output window reporting both the analysis and the security
results obtained by the post-processing module, and some statistics about
the computational costs of the performed analysis.
Editor
Mobile Ambient
process
Parser Start
Proc
parProc Proc
AmbProc AmbProc
Ident [ Proc ] Ident [ Proc ]
venice warsaw NullProcNullProc
00
Data
Structures
Analysis
Post−processing
Security Results
Statistics
Analysis
Results
Editing Parsing Analysis
Syntax Tree
Output
Security Labeling
Textual Editor
Security Labeling
Graphical Editor
Lexical Analyzer
Syntax Checker
Security Labels
Checking
Braghin et al.
Nielson
Fix Point
Computation
Fix Point
Computation
Fig. 7. Overview of the Banana tool.
8 This implementation does not use the algorithm in [12] and it has a O(N5) worst-case
time complexity.
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Figure 7 gives an overview of the architecture of the tool. Banana is im-
plemented in Java and strongly exploits the modularity of object-oriented
technology, thus allowing scalability to other analyses and extensions of the
target language (e.g., [17]). Moreover, Banana is conceived as an applet based
on AWT and thus compatible with the majority of current web browsers sup-
porting Java.
A screen-shot of the Banana tool is shown in Figure 8. A user can edit
Fig. 8. Screen-shot of the Banana tool.
the process to be analyzed by using either the Textual or the Graphical Editor.
The security labelling (i.e., the labels denoting untrusted, conﬁdential, and
boundary ambients) can be inserted directly by the user, or automatically
derived by the tool during the parsing phase. In the latter case, ambients
starting with letter ‘b’ are labelled boundaries, while ambients starting with
‘h’ are labelled high. By selecting an item in the Project Explorer window, the
user can check/modify the properties of the ambient/capability. The syntax
correctness of the process can be veriﬁed by selecting the Parsing button.
The user can then choose to launch one of the algorithms which implement
the analysis described in [6,8,15]. Once the analysis has started, the tool parses
the process, builds a syntax tree, and computes the algorithm yielding to an
over-approximation of all possible ambient nestings. The result of the analysis
is reported in the Output Console as a list of pairs of labels.
By post-processing the analysis results, Banana reports in the ﬁled Pro-
tective the sure absence of information leakages.
The Banana tool has been tested using a suite of use cases consisting of
processes diﬀering in the size and number of capabilities.
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5 Conclusion
Security is a major concern for computation in open networks, and is often
considered a serious source of potential limitation to a widespread use of mobile
code technologies. In this paper, we have studied information ﬂow security in
the calculus of Mobile Ambients with a static approach.
Plans of future work include the reﬁnement of the analysis abstract do-
mains, and the study of the relationship among types, abstract interpretation,
and control ﬂow analysis. Enhancing the precision of the analysis result can
aﬀect the eﬃciency of the analysis: a careful study is therefore needed to bal-
ance the precision and the eﬃciency of the analysis. In addition, we believe
that the formalization of the CFA and types in a common setting would allow
us to compare their expressive power, understand the relative merits of each
approach, and, possibly, for which class of properties one method is more ad-
equate than another. We are presently studying how to extend our approach
to the full calculus and to more “concrete” version of Ambients, e.g., Boxed
and Safe Ambients [9,17].
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